Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

The Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City
Corporation; Salt Lake City Commission in its
Capacity as Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
City, Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B. Lloyd Poelman; William D. Oswald of Strong, Poelman and Fox; Attorneys for Respondents.
Louis H. Callister, Sr.; W. Clark Burt of Callister, Greene and Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, The Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corporation; Salt Lake City Commission in its Capacity as Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City, Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake, No. 13722.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/882

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RHeEfVED
LAW LIBRARY

IN THE

SUPREME COURT nrrA
DEC6

OF THE

STATE

1975

O F U T A U J G [ , A M YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

THE MAIN PARKING MALL, a Utah ^
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION:
Case No.
SALT LAKE CITY COMMISSION
IN ITS CAPACITY AS REDEVEL13722
OPMENT AGENCY OF S A L T
LAKE CITY; AND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE
CITY,
Defendants and Respondents. J
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, District Judge
B. LLOYD POELMAN
STEPHEN G. STOKER
of STRONG, POELMAN & FOX
315 East Second South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, SR.
j— R |
|P
!1
lr
W.CLARK BURT
*"
"
*
of CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER
,, n w o . iq 74
mJv
800 Kennecott Building
°
Salt Digitized
Lake City,
UtahW.84133
by the Howard
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Chri,
Clark Law
School,Court,
BYU. Utah
Supreme
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorneys forMachine-generated
Plaintiff-Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT

1
2

RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS

2
3

ARGUMENT

7

APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS
PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION:
A. REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY HAS AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION" AGREEMENT WITH HARTNETT-SHAW
7
B. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO
INTERPRET THE FEDERAL LAW AND
REGULATIONS WHICH COMPRISE
THRESHOLD ISSUES UNDER PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
9
C. PLAINTIFF IS WITHOUT STANDING
TO SEEK DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
DETERMINING PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION" AGREEMENT
13
D. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WAS PREMATURE AND ITS ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EXHIBITS THERETO
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
E. THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY
ALLEGATIONS
20
CONCLUSION

21
AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES
Hunter v. New York, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (Sup.
Ct. 1944)
10
Int'l Broth, of Teamsters Local 389 v. Bekins
Van & Storage Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 692,
288 P. 2d 181, 184 (1955)
14
Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of the City
of Oakland, California, 317 F. 2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert, den., 375 U. S. 915 (1963) .. 12
Lyon v. Bateman, 119 U. 434, 228 P. 2d 818
(1951)
14
Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968)
11,13
Powelton Civic Homeowners Assoc, v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
284 Fed. Supp. 809 (D. C. Pa. 1968)
13
State v. Goss, 79 U. 559, 11 P. 2d 340, 341-42
(1932)

9

Western Additional Community Organization v.
Weber, 294 Fed. Supp. 433 (D. C. Cal. 1968) 13
STATUTES AND RULES
11-19-3 Utah Code Annotated (as amended)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7,8

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
78-33-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (as
amended)
14
Section 78-33-2
14
5 U. S. C. §§552, 553
11
42 U. S. C. §§1441-1469 (Federal Housing Act
of 1949)
10
Section 1455(c)(2)
13
Section 1455(f)
13
Rule 65A (e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE MAIN PARKING MALL, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION:
Case No.
SALT LAKE CITY COMMISSION
IN ITS CAPACITY AS REDEVEL13722
OPMENT AGENCY OF S A L T
LAKE CITY; AND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE
CITY,
Defendants and Respondents. J

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant's amended complaint in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sought injunctive
relief against the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
City and others together with declaratory judgment regarding the Agency's tentative plans for revelopment
of a portion of Salt Lake City's central business district.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding, determined that Appellant's amended complaint
failed to state a cause of action and ordered that the
amended complaint be dismissed.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL
The Appellant, Main Parking Mall, seeks reversal
of the trial court's judgment of dismissal and an order
remanding this case for a trial on the merits.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION:
A. REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY HAS AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION" AGREEMENT WITH HARTNETT-SHAW.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET THE FEDERAL LAW AND
REGULATIONS W H I C H COMPRISE
THRESHOLD ISSUES UNDER PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
C. PLAINTIFF IS WITHOUT STANDING
TO SEEK DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DETERMINING PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION" AGREEMENT.
D. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WAS PREMATURE AND ITS ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EXHIBITS THERETO.
E. THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY
ALLEGATIONS.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents supplement and clarify Appellant's
statement of facts as follows:
In accordance with part of a legally adopted plan
for neighborhood redevelopment, the Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City (herein sometimes designated
"Redevolpmenit Agency") acquired title to all except
the Main Street frontage and the southwest corner of
a city block in downtown Salt Lake City bordered by
Main Street, West Temple, Second South and Third
South Streets (R. 79). The property was previously held
by a number of owners including the Appellant, Main
Parking Mall. The redevelopment project area is designated Central Business District West (CBD West).
The purpose of the program under which the propDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erty was acquired is to remove blight. After blighted
land has been acquired and cleared by the Agency, the
land is made available for sale to private redeveloped
at a price not less than the value of its reuse appraisal.
A reuse appraisal is related to a particular proposed development and cannot be made until the nature and
scope of the proposed development is determined.
Primary considerations in the disposition process are:
(1) nature, quality and design of the proposed improvements, (2) financial ability of the private redeveloper
to complete proposed improvements, and (3) demonstrated experience or ability of the private redevelopers
to achieve the proposed results.
By a resolution passed on February 8, 1973, the
Board of Commissioners of the Redevelopment Agency
authorized the offering of the subject CBD West property, containing approximately 6.5 acres, for preliminary
proposals for its redevelopment (R. 77). The resolution
declares that the competition-negotiation method without
a bid price requirement would be used to select a redeveloper. During March 1973 advertisements announcing
the offer appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret
News, Wall Street Journal and Business Week. Those
who indicated interest in becoming redevelopers of the
project were given additional details and requirements
of the offer and were also furnished a copy of an urban
design study of the project property which had been commissioned by the Redevelopment Agency (R. 80).
The deadline for filing notices of interest was exDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tended from May 10, 1973 to June 7, 1973. Indications
of interest were received by the Redevelopment Agency
from more than thirty prospective redevelopers. Five of
those indicating interest subsequently stated their intention to submit proposals for the project, but only four
proposals were submitted, including one by Appellant.
On July 25, 1973, after proposals from three other
prospective redevelopers had been received and considered, representatives of Appellant presented a proposal
to the Agency which consisted of a preliminary architectural rendering, a site plan and a statement of the redeveloper's experience Mid its interest in the project. The
governing board of the Redevelopment Agency, in proper
exercise of its discretion, thereupon determined that only
one of the four proposals, (that submitted by HartnettShaw Development Company, Inc.) met the requirements
which had been established. The Hartnett-Shaw proposal was for a $40 million development containing an
18-sitory Sheraton Hotel and a large office building.
After the preliminary screening, further time and
expense were required to determine feasibility and to
explore refinements of the Hartnett-Shaw proposal. To
justify expenditure by Hartnett-Shaw of approximately
$100,000 for architectural work and other studies (R.
189) and to assure that the Redevelopment Agency
would not negotiate with other interested parties until
there had been adequate opportunity to reach final
agreement on numerous details or conclude that such
final agreement was impossible, the Redevelopment
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6
Agency and Hartnett-Shaw entered into an "exclusive
negotiation" agreement (R. 228-231).
Appellant filed a complaint requesting injunctive
and declaratory relief against Respondents on November
9, 1973, alleging that the procedures followed by the Redevelopment Agency were unfair to Appellant as a prospective redeveloper. Plaintiff simultaneously obtained
an order requiring Defendants to show cause why the
relief sought by Plaintiff should not be summarily granted.
Defendants objected to the order to show cause and
moved for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.
At a hearing before the court on November 30, 1973
Plaintiff consented to a vacation of the order to show
cause and the parties spent two hours before the court
arguing Defendants' motion to dismiss, whereupon the
court indicated it was ready to rule. However, it granted
Plaintiff's request for ten days within which to file a
memorandum. Plaintiff thereafter requested and received
a further extension of time for filing its memorandum because it wanted a transcript of the oral arguments at the
hearing. While Judge Jeppson had Defendants' motion
to dismiss under advisement, Plaintiff obtained from another judge on January 23, 1974 (during Judge Jeppson's
Vacation absence) an order permitting Plaintiff to take
depositions. Plaintiff took depositions on January 31,
1974 and March 8, 1974.
To bring to decision its motion which had been under
advisement since November 30, 1973, Defendants filed on
April 26, 1974 a notice of further hearing and request
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for ruling. At the request of Plaintiff the further hearing
was delayed until May 17, 1974 at which time Plaintiff
requested and was granted leave to file an amended
complaint. Defendants immediately filed an answer to
the amended complaint and renewed their motions for
dismissal and summary judgment. After hearing the
motions on May 24, 1974 the amended complaint was
dismissed (R. 7-8).
POINT A.
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY HAS AUTHORITY TO ENTER
INTO THE "EXCLUSIVE NEGOTIATION"
AGREEMENT WITH HARTNETT-SHAW.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City was created pursuant to §11-19-3 Utah Code Annotated which
provides:
11-19-3. Designation of redevelopment
agency—Powers and duties.— Each community by enactment of an ordinance by its legislative body may designate the legislative body
of the community as the redevelopment agency of such community, which agency shall be
authorized to enter into contracts generally
and shall have power to transact the business
and exercise all the powers provided for in this
act. The agency may accept financial or other
assistance from any public or private source for
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the agency's activities, powers, and duties, and
expend any funds so received for any of the
purposes of this act. The agency may borrow
money or accept financial or other assistance
from the state or the federal government for
any redevelopment project within [its area
of] operation and comply with any conditions
of such loan or grant, (emphasis added.)
Thus, the Redevelopment Agency is granted hroad
power to enter into contracts and its permission to comply with conditions of loans or grants from either state
or federal sources is permissive rather than mandatory.
It should be noted that throughout Appellant's brief,
reference to the foregoing statutory section consistently
reflects Appellant's pivotal error in its assertion that the
permissive language concerning compliance with conditions of loans or grants is somehow made mandatory
and that such mandatory requirement somehow attains
the status of law.
Although this statute gives assurance to federal or
state lenders that complaince with loan conditions will
be authorized and permitted, it cannot reasonably be
read to create in a third party a cause of action against
the borrower in Utah courts. If a third party has any
justiciable interest under such circumstances, it could
only be against the lender for failure to enforce the conditions of such loan or grant, or against the state of Utah
for failure to permit proper compliance by the borrower.
Not only is the language of §11-9-3 entirely permis-
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sive, but the long-standing prohibition against delegation of legislative prerogatives and responsibilities also
applies to this issue. (See e.g. State v. Goss, 79 U. 559,
11 P. 2d 340, 341-42 (1932).) While the legislature may
permit an agency to accept funds from the federal government subject to compliance with its proper conditions,
to construe such contractual agreements or administrative guidelines as having the status of law would offend
the prohibition against delegation of legislative prerogatives. Section 11-19-3 was enacted in 1970 and the Master
Agreements and Urban Renewal Handbook referred to
by Appellant are all of subsequent origin.
POINT B.
APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET
THE FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATIONS
WHICH COMPRISE THRESHOLD ISSUES
UNDER PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.
One of the remedies sought by Appellant's original
complaint and by its amended complaint (though vaguely
worded and not couched in proper "mandatory injunction" language) is "That this court make an order requiring the Defendants to follow the Rules and Regulations of Master Agreements and the Urban Renewal
Handbook in the disposition of said property" (R. 73-76).
To grant this relief sought by Plaintiff would require
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the trial court to construe and interpret such "Rules and
Regulations, Master Agreements and the Urban Renewal
Handbook" in the course of determining whether Defendants were violating or threatening to violate such provisions. Even if all the provisions on which Appellant
relies were "Rules and Regulations" (which Respondents
deny), such interpretation and construction would require the state court to go beyond its jurisdiction. Because such rules and regulations would have to be promulgated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to authority of the Housing Act of
1949 (42 U. S. C. §1441 through 1469) their interpretation, and actions to enforce compliance therewith, would
be reserved exclusively to the federal courts.
In Hunter v. New York, 121 N. Y. S. 2nd 841 (Sup.
Ot. 1944), where third party individual plaintiffs sought
to attack activities of an urban renewal project funded
under the Housing Act of 1949, the court dismissed the
complaint stating:
Assuming arguendo, plaintiffs have legal
capacity to sue under the Act and may maintain the action at bar, nevertheless the complaint must be dismissed for the reason that
neither this court nor any other state court is
the proper forum for such suit; state courts
have no jurisdiction over the acts of federal officials acting as such in the administration of
the federal laws or as agencies of the federal
government. Perkins v Lukens Steel Co.,
supra (310 U.S. 113, 125 60 S. Ct. 869, 876,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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84 L. E d 1108); Tennessee Electric Power
Co. v Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S.
118, 59 S. Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543; Mount
Hope Development Corp. v James, 258 N.Y.
510, 180 N . E . 252; Armand Schnoll, Inc. v
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 286 N.Y.
503, 506, 37 U.E. 2d 225, 138 A.L.R. 1187.
(Id. at 847-48).
See also Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 Fed. 2d 920, 936 n. 38 (2d Cir. 1968), where
the court said it saw Hunter as holding that state courts
have no jurisdiction to review actions of agencies of the
federal government.
Even if the state courts were permitted to interpret,
construe and enforce compliance with federal regulations,
the lower court herein was correct in finding that the
provisions of the Urban Renewal Handbook on winch
Appellant relies did not have the binding force of law.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act declares that
rules and regulations enacted by United States government agencies take effect with the binding force of law
only after noticed hearings are held and the rules or
regulations are published in the Federal Register. See
5 U. S. C. §§552 and 553. The provisions of the Urban
Renewal Handbook have never been the subject of such
hearings nor have they been published in the Federal
Register. As a result, they do not constitute the law of
the United States or of the State of Utah.
P&ragraph 25 of Appellant's amended complaint
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alleges that the "exclusive negotiation" agreement between Redevelopment Agency and Hartnett-Shaw was
entered into "unlawfully and contrary to the Neighborhood Development Program and Master Agreement. . ."
(R. 72). While Appellant's brief states it is not "attacking any of the agreements entered into between the
U. S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
and the Respondents" (Appellant's Brief page 14), Appellant seeks to enforce provisions of such agreement in
the state courts — presumably on a third party beneficiary theory.
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of
Oakland, California, 317 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963), cert,
den., 375 U. S. 915, 11 Law. Ed. 2d 154, 84 Su. Ct. 216
(1963), the Circuit Court stated with respect to an effort
by certain individuals to challenge action by a redevelopment agency under the same provisions of the Housing
Act of 1949 upon which plaintiff herein apparently relies:
W e find no indication that Congress intended
this section of the Housing Act to give a right
of action to those not a party to the contract
between Redevelopment A g e n c y and the
United States.
More specifically, with respect to the Plaintiff's argument that they were third party beneficiaries of a contract between the United States and the Redevelopment
Agency entered into pursuant to the Housing Act of
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1949, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the
Johnson case, supra:
The federal courts have consistently held that
those not parties to the contract have no standing to enforce conditions imposed on redevelopment agencies by the United States, although those suing would benefit from such
enforcement.
Appellant cites Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (2d Cix. 1968); Powelton
Civic Homeowners Association v. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 284 Fed. Supp. 809 (D. C. Pa.
1968); and Western Additional Community Organization
v. Weber, 294 Fed. Supp, 433 (D. C. Cal. 1968) as case
evidence that standing to sue under the Housing Act
of 1949 has been expanded by congressional amendment.
The only applicable congressional enactments are 1965
and 1966 amendments to Section 1455(c) (2) and Section 1455(f) of the Act which deal exclusively with the
adequacy of replacement housing for tenants about to
be displaced by urban renewal projects. Appellant is
not in the position of a tenant about to be displaced, and
thus the cited cases do not provide a basis for standing
to bring the present action.
POINT C.
APPELLANT'S A M E N D E D COMPLAINT
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF IS WITHOUT STANDING TO

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SEEK DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DETERMINING THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE "EXCLUSIVE N E G O T I A T I O N "
AGREEMENT BETWEEN REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY AND HARTNETT-SHAW.
Another form of relief sought by Appellant in its
complaint and amended complaint (without clearly specifying that it seeks declaratory judgment pursuant to §7833-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated) is "That said agreement between the defendant and Hartnett-S'haw Development Company, Inc. be declared null and void" (R.
73 through R. 76). The relief sought is a statutory remedy as set forth in §78-33-2, Utah Code Annotated (1963),
which provides that such declaratory judgment is available only to persons "whose rights, status or other legal
relations" are affected by such a contract. In paragraph
41 of Appellant's amended complaint it alleges that the
"exclusive negotiation" agreement is "so ambiguous, uncertain and in many respects unintelligible as to its terms
that it is unenforceable and of no force and effect." Since
there is no dispute between the parties to that agreement
concerning its terms and provisions, and because Plaintiff is not a party to the contract nor directly affected
by its terms, it lacks standing to seek the declaratory
judgment relief prayed for. Lyon v. Bateman, 119 U. 434,
228 P. 2d 818 (1951); Infl Broth, of Teamsters Local
389 v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 692,
288 P. 2d 181, 184 (1955).
Even if Plaintiff had standing to seek a declaratory
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judgment interpreting the provisions of the contract, the
court was able to determine as a matter of law that its
language was not ambiguous, uncertain or unintelligible
and that as a matter of law it was not beyond the power
of Redevelopment Agency to enter into the agreement.
POINT D.
PLAINTIFFS A M E N D E D COMPLAINT
WAS PREMATURE AND ITS ESSENTIAL
ALLEGATIONS ARE CONTRADICTED BY
THE EXHIBITS THERETO.
Assuming, arguendo, (1) that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) that Plaintiff had
standing to sue, and (3) that the court was able to exercise its declaratory judgment powers to determine the
validity and/or construction of the "exclusive negotiation" agreement, all of the essential facts concerning
fundamental issues before the court were embodied in
the pleadings, supporting and opposing affidavits, and
matters received in evidence at the two hour hearing held
on November 30, 1973 (which transcript Appellant ordered shortly after the hearing but for its own reasons
has chosen to exclude from the record on appeal herein).
The existence and language of the "exclusive negotiation" agreement was in evidence and undisputed. The
provisions of the Urban Renewal Handbook which Appellant deemed controlling were placed before the court
as Exhibits D and E to the original complaint. From
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these the court was able to determine that Plaintiff's
complaint was premature, no justiciable issue was before
the court, and Defendants had in fact complied with the
rules and regulations which Plaintiff asserted were binding upon it.
Appellant has persistently taken the posture that
the "exclusive negotiation" agreement of August 22, 1973
(clearest copy is found at R. 228-230) is a final agreement for disposition of the subject parcel notwithstanding:
1. The beginning sentence of that letter
agreement states "The Redevelopment Agency
of Salt Lake City, hereinafter designated as
'Agency', hereby offers to negotiate with
Hartnett-Shaw Development Company, Inc.,
an Illinois corporation, hereinafter referred to
as "redeveloper" for the period of one hundred
eighty (180) days next following the acceptance of this offer for the purchase and development of the project area known as Parcel B-l,
CBD West Neighborhood Development Program Project." (emphasis added)
2. Numbered paragraph 1 in the letter
agreement states in part: "Upon the execution
of a Redevelopment Contract between the
Agency and the Redeveloper, the Redeveloper
will tender to the Agency, as earnest money for
the performance of said contract by the Redeveloper, a certified check . . .", clearly evidencing the contemplation of a future contract.
3.

Numbered paragraph 2 of the subject
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agreement states in part: "Immediately upon
acceptance of this offer by the Redeveloper,
the Redeveloper will designate one representative for contract negotiations and an architect for design conferences. The representative
shall be given authority to act as a spokesman
for the Redeveloper during the negotiations
regarding the subject parcel . . .", clearly indicating that future negotiations were contemplated.
4. Numbered paragraph 3 of the agreement states in part: "During the negotiating
period, the Redeveloper will submit to the
Agency periodic reports as to the progress of
the development, design and other activities . . ."
5. Numbered paragraph 4 states in part:
"The purchase price of the subject property
shall be determined by negotiation . . ."
6. Numbered paragraph 8 states in part
"The right to negotiate for the purchase and
development of the subject property shall be
exclusive in the Redeveloper for the duration
of the one hundred eighty (180) day period
next following the acceptance by the Redeveloper."
7. Numbered paragraph 9 states in part
"In the event that negotiations do not culminate in an executed agreement to purchase and
develop the parcel B-l, the Redeveloper will
submit to the Agency its findings and determinations regarding the proposed developments and copies of all studies and reports
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made by it . . .", clearly indicating that both
parties contemplated certain procedures if a
final contract is not entered into.
Appellant complains that in offering the property
for redevelopment, the Redevelopment Agency improperly deleted the bid price requirement under the competition-negotiation selection method and points to language on page 1 of Exhibit E to its original complaint
(R.219) that the Redevelopment Agency "must accept
the highest bid received from the bidders who meet the
bidding requirements, provided the bid equals or exceeds
the approved minimum price." (Emphasis added.) The
court also had before it the next sentences which state
"This does not preclude the establishment of criteria,
such as design standards, . . . necessary to qualify a
bidder for final selection. A two-stage offering in which
proposals are selected on the basis of factors other than
price, to compete at a later date on the basis of price,
is acceptable."
Even under the acompetition-negotiation,, method,
the provisions of the Urban Renewal Handbook (R. 213)
provide:
COMPETITION-N E G O T I A T I O N
C O M B I N A T I O N The availability of the
land is made known by public announcement,
but selection is made after negoation with one
or more redevelopers whose initial proposals
have been determined to be most acceptable.
A public hearing on the proposal is required
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prior to execution of the contract, (emphasis
added)
These provisions are further amplified on page 6 of
Exhibit E to Appellant's original complaint (R. 224) in
which the first statement under the heading "(2) Competition-Negotiation Ck>mbimtion" says:
The two steps in this method, public offering and the selection by negotiation, are designed to assure opportunity to all potential
redevelopers to submit proposals and to give
the L P A [local public agency or, in this case
the Redevelopment Agency] flexibility in
making its selection/' (emphasis added)
The data sheet furnished by the Redevelopment
Agency to potential redevelopers, copy of which was
attached to Appellant's original compkinit as Exhibit A
(R. 209), includes the statement: "The Redevelopment
Agency reserves the right to reject any or all proposals
. . ." Such a right is specifically permitted by the Urban
Renewal Handbook (R. 214).
It is to be observed that nowhere in Plaintiffs
amended complaint is there an allegation that the governing body of the Redevelopment Agency abused its
discretion. It is clear that Appellant has chosen to read
only selected sections of the handbook rules upon which
it relies, without giving proper consideration to those
other sections which show that the Redevelopment
Agency has proceeded properly to this point. However,
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the trial court was not prevented from reading the entire
content of exhibits attached to Appellant's complaint,
rather than merely those isolated sections which Appellant chose to emphasize. In viewing the whole amended
complaint, including exhibits which Plaintiff had placed
before the court, the court was justified in reaching the
compelling decision that the amended complaint feiiled
to state a cause of action.
POINT E.
THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY ALLEGATIONS.
The injunctive relief sought by Appellant's amended
complaint ("The Defendants be enjoined from further
negotiations with Hartnett-Shaw Development Company,
Inc." R. 73 and 75.) was not supported by allegations
that (1) Plaintiffs remedies at law are inadequate, (2)
Plaintiff would suffer irreparable damage, or (3) that
final action by the Revelopment Agency in disposing of
the property was so imminent that invokng the injunctive powers of the court was necessary to prevent some
irreversible action. In the absence of such allegations or
ones of similar import, no cause of action for injunctive
relief may be maintained. Rule 65A(e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
On the contrary, the affidavit of Honorable E. J.
Gam, Mayor of Salt Lake City (R. 188) stated: "If
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present negotiations [between Redevelopment Agency
and Hartnett-Shaw] result in proposals mutually agreeable in all of their terms, then a public hearing will be
scheduled to assure full cxmsideration of all relevant aspects prior to executing a final agreement with HartnettShaw or any other proposed developer." Such affidavit
was not opposed by Appellant, and indeed that statement was reaffirmed in the subsequent deposition testimony of Mayor Gam in this action.
CONCLUSION
Appellant had full opportunity to present its proposal
for redevelopment of a parcel of land available for that
purpose. The proposal was considered and rejected in
favor of a competing proposal which, in the proper exercise of the discretion of the City Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, sitting as the governing board of the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, was deemed superior.
Appellant's claims that Defendants have failed to
comply with federal agency regulations, even if such
claims were valid, could be brought only in the federal
court. Appellant lacks standing to obtain a declaratory
judgment concerning a contract to which it is not a party
and in which it has no direct interest.
Appellant's complaint lacked allegations of inadequacy of remedies at law, irreparable injury, and the
imminance of any threatened action, all of which are
essential pleadings for the injunctive relief sought.
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Looking at the entire complaint, including all exhibits thereto, the trial court could and properly did
find that Appellant's amended complaint had failed to
state a cause of action supporting the relief sought. The
ruling of the lower court should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX
By: B. Lloyd Poelman
Stephen G. Stoker
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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